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1 Proofs
Lemma 1 In any electoral equilibrium in PE, voters vote sincerely.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose voter i’s preferred candidate is k∗(i) ∈ K, and
that k˜ ∈ K and k˜ 6= k∗(i). Let tk(σv−i) denote the number of votes for candidate
k given a voting strategy profile σv−i for all voters other than i. The payoff for i of
voting for k˜ given σv−i, U(k˜;σ
v
−i), is∑
k 6=k˜,k∗(i)∈K
tk(σ
v
−i)
n
u(xk; z
i) +
[tk˜(σ
v
−i) + 1]
n
u(xk˜; z
i) +
tk∗(i)(σ
v
−i)
n
u(xk∗(i); z
i).
Similarly, the payoff for i of voting for k∗(i) given σv−i, U(k
∗(i);σv−i), is∑
k 6=k˜,k∗(i)∈K
tk(σ
v
−i)
n
u(xk; z
i) +
tk˜(σ
v
−i)
n
u(xk˜; z
i) +
[tk∗(i)(σ
v
−i) + 1]
n
u(xk∗(i); z
i).
Thus
U(k∗(i);σv−i)− U(k˜;σv−i) =
1
n
[u(xk∗(i); z
i)− u(xk˜; zi)],
which is positive by definition of k∗(i). Since σv−i was arbitrary, this shows that
voting sincerely strictly dominates voting for any other available candidate and is
thus a dominant strategy for voter i. It follows that in all Nash equilibria in the
voting stage voters vote sincerely among candidates running for office.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proof of Part 1. Take K ≥ 3 given. We will show
that if the inequalities (1), (2), and (3) are satisfied,
c < F, (1)
1
2K
≤ F ≤ 1
K
− c, (2)
and
α <
1
Ψ(1)K
, (3)
1
then there exists a LS equilibrium in which K candidates run for office without
fully investing in persuasive campaigning. These conditions define a non-trivial set
of parameters: if c < 1
2K
, there exists an interval [F (K), F (K)] such that F ∈
[F (K), F (K)] satisfies (1), and (2). Finally, any α < 1
Ψ(1)K
satisfies (3).
So, define L ≡ max{2c, c + F, 1−2F
K−1 } and U ≡ min{2(c + F ), 1K}. We show below
that if max{2αΨ(1), L(K)} < U(K), then there exists a LS equilibrium in which
K ≥ 3 run for office without fully investing in persuasive campaigning. But this is
enough to prove the first part of the proposition, since these conditions are implied
by the inequalities (1), (2), and (3).1
Consider first the interior candidates k = 2, . . . , K − 1. If θ∗j = θ∗r < 1 for all
j, r 6= k, then in the continuous approximation as T goes to infinity k’s marginal vote
share is differentiable, and k’s FOC is given by 2α
∆
v′(θ∗k) = C
′(θ∗k). Therefore,
θ∗k = θ
∗ = Ψ−1
(
∆
2α
)
for all k = 2, . . . , K − 1.
Moreover, since θ∗ < 1, it must be that ∆ > 2αΨ(1). Non-negative rents for interior
candidates requires that Π∗k = ∆−C(θ∗)− F ≥ 0, or equivalently θ∗ ≤ C−1(∆− F ).
Substituting θ∗ we get ∆ ≥ 2αΨ(C−1(∆−F )). Note that 2αΨ(1) ≥ 2αΨ(C−1(∆−F ))
if and only if ∆ ≥ c+ F . Then, as long as in equilibrium ∆ ≥ c+ F (i.e., Πk(1) ≥ 0
for k = 2, . . . , K − 1), ∆ ≥ 2αΨ(1) implies ∆ ≥ 2αΨ(C−1(∆ − F )); i.e., if interior
candidates are choosing (the same) non-maximal campaign investment, they obtain
non-negative rents. It will be sufficient for our result to look for equilibria in which
∆ ≥ c+ F , and therefore we require that
max{c+ F, 2αΨ(1)} < ∆. (4)
Next, we consider the possibility of entry. First, we require that all equilibrium
candidates have an incentive not to drop from the competition in any continuation
1The condition max{2αΨ(1), L(K)} < U(K) embodies six relevant inequalities: (a) αΨ(1) <
c+F , (b) 2αΨ(1) < 1/K, (c) 2c < 1/K, (d) (c+F ) < 1/K, (e) 1−2FK−1 < 1/K and (f)
1−2F
K−1 < 2[c+F ].
Note that (e) can be written as F > 12K , and (f) as F >
1
2K −K−1K c. Thus (e) implies (f). Moreover,
from this it follows that 1K < 2[c + F ], and that therefore (b) implies (a). Finally, given (1), (d)
implies (c). Inequalities (d) and (f) give (2).
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game. For this it is sufficient that min{∆0, ∆2 } ≥ c. Since 2∆0 + (K − 1)∆ = 1, then
∆0 =
1−(K−1)∆
2
, and the previous condition can be written as
2c ≤ ∆ ≤ 1− 2c
K − 1 . (5)
Suppose now that j enters at xj ∈ (xk, xk+1) for k = 1, . . . , K − 1, and define
δrj ≡ xk+1−xj∆ . Suppose first that in the continuation θˆk = θˆk+1 = θˆj = 1. Then it
must be that
αv′(1)
[
1
δrj∆
+
1
∆
]
≥ C ′(1),
αv′(1)
[
1
(1− δrj )∆
+
1
∆
]
≥ C ′(1).
Then if δrj ≥ 12 (j enters in (xk, xk+1) closer to xk than to xk+1) the first two
inequalities above hold if and only if ∆ ≤ αΨ(1)
[
1 + 1
δrj
]
, or δrj ≤ αΨ(1)∆−αΨ(1) . Thus,
the continuation strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for 1
2
≤ δrj ≤ αΨ(1)∆−αΨ(1) , which is
feasible if and only if ∆ ≤ 3αΨ(1). When instead δrj ≤ 12 (j enters closer to xk) then
we need ∆ ≤ αΨ(1)
[
1 + 1
(1−δrj )
]
, or δrj ≥ ∆−2αΨ(1)∆−αΨ(1) . Thus, the continuation strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium for ∆−2αΨ(1)
∆−αΨ(1) ≤ δrj ≤ 12 , which is feasible if and only if
∆ ≤ 3αΨ(1). Therefore, the strategy profile θˆk = θˆk+1 = θˆj = 1 is a Nash equilibrium
in the continuation for entrants such that
∆− 2αΨ(1)
∆− αΨ(1) ≤ δ
r
j ≤
αΨ(1)
∆− αΨ(1) , (6)
where 2αΨ(1) < ∆ ≤ 3αΨ(1). Since the entrant in this case obtains Πˆj = ∆2 − [c+F ],
then as long as in equilibrium
∆ < 2[c+ F ], (7)
entry in an “interior” region as in (6) is not profitable. It should be clear that this
rules out “interior” entrants only, since 2αΨ(1) < ∆ from (4) implies with (6) that
δrj ∈ (0, 1).
Consider then δrj >
αΨ(1)
∆−αΨ(1) (j enters close to xk; the other case is symmetric).
Consider the continuation θˆk = θˆj = 1, θˆk+1 = Ψ
−1(
δrj
1+δrj
∆
α
) < 1. This is clearly an
3
equilibrium in the continuation (j and k have even a greater incentive to choose 1
than in the previous case since they are now closer substitutes). For entry not to be
profitable, we need
Πˆj =
∆
2
+
α
δrj∆
[v(1)− v(θˆk+1)]− [c+ F ] < 0,
and a sufficient condition for the above inequality to be true is
∆ ≤ 2F. (8)
To see this, suppose that the division of the electorate between k and j were fixed,
with cutpoint x˜kj =
xk+xj
2
. Then j would optimally choose θ˜j = Ψ
−1(
δrj∆
α
) < θˆk+1,
and we have that
Πˆj ≤ ∆
2
− α
δrj∆
[v(θˆk+1)− v(θ˜j)]− [C(θ˜j) + F ] < ∆
2
− [C(θ˜j) + F ].
Consider next optimality and non-negative rents for extreme candidates, and no-
entry conditions at the extremes. Note first that given that interior candidates are
choosing non-maximal campaign investment, then optimal campaign investment by
extreme candidates must be non-maximal as well. In particular, it must be that
θ∗1 = θ
∗
K = Ψ
−1(∆
α
). For no entry at the extremes it is sufficient as before that
∆0 < F , and since ∆0 =
1−(K−1)∆
2
this can be written as
1− 2F
K − 1 < ∆. (9)
For non-negative rents we need Π∗1 = ∆0 +
∆
2
− α
∆
[v(θ∗)− v(θ∗1)]−C(θ∗1)−F ≥ 0.
Since Π∗1 is maximized at θ
∗
1, then Π1(θ
∗
1) ≥ Π1(θ1) for all θ1 6= θ∗1 and, as a result,
it suffices to show that Π1(θ
∗) > 0, or equivalently, (K−2)
2
∆ + [C(θ∗) + F ] ≤ 1
2
. But
since in equilibrium ∆ ≥ C(θ∗) + F , then it is sufficient that
∆ ≤ 1
K
. (10)
We have then shown that the strategy profile specified above is an electoral equilib-
rium (in which all candidates choose non-maximal campaign investment) if ∆ satisfies
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conditions (4) - (10). Now, (4) and (8) imply that for this to be feasible it is necessary
that c < F (∗). From (∗), c + F < ∆ in (4) and (10) imply (5), and (7) implies (8).
The relevant conditions on the degree of policy differentiation, ∆, can then be written
as max {2αΨ(1), L} ≤ ∆ < U , as we wanted to show.
Proof of Part 2. Consider first the case of K = 2. Note that since identically
located candidates are perfect substitutes, in equilibrium campaign investment must
be maximal. Otherwise candidate k can increase rents discretely (in fact capturing
all votes) by increasing θk (and costs) only marginally. The rents of candidates are
non-negative if and only if 1
2
− c ≥ F . To show that an equilibrium cannot exist it is
enough to show that there exists a small positive ν such that entry of a third candidate
at x′ = 1
2
− ν is always profitable. Note that if a third candidate j enters at x′ with
θj = 1 either θˆk = 1 for k = 1, 2, or θˆk = 1 and θˆ−k = 0, k = 1, 2 (12 − c ≥ F implies
that the case θˆk = 0, k = 1, 2 can never happen). If
1
2
(1− x′+1/2
2
)−c = 3−2x′
8
−c ≥ 0, we
have that in the continuation game θˆk = 1, k = 1, 2, and to deter entry at x˜ we need
x′+ 1
2
2
− c < F . When ν → 0 the two last inequalities become 1
2
− c ∈ [1
4
, F
]
. Together
with the above condition for non-negative rents for candidates, the last expression
implies that a two candidate equilibrium with perfectly centrist candidates exists if
and only if F ≥ 1
4
and 1
2
− c = F . If instead 3−2x˜
8
− c < 0, we have that in the
continuation game one of the two running candidates will drop, i.e., θˆk = 1, and
θˆ−k = 0, k = 1, 2. Since to deter entry at x˜ it must be that
x′+ 1
2
2
− c < F , in this
case when ν → 0 we need 1
2
− c ≤ min{1
4
, F
}
. Combining the last expression with
the condition for non-negative rents shows that a two candidate equilibrium with
perfectly centrist candidates exists if and only if F ≤ 1
4
and 1
2
− c = F . If K > 2 we
need
x′+ 1
2
2
− c < F and 1
K
− c ≥ F , which leads to a contradiction when ν → 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Note first that in any equilibrium all candidates that
are running for office must tie, since otherwise there would be at least one candidate
who would lose for sure and - given the fixed cost of running for office F > 0 -
would prefer not to run. Since candidates are tying, in equilibrium voters must vote
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sincerely. If this were not the case, there would exist some voter who is not voting
for her most preferred candidate in equilibrium but who could have this candidate
winning with probability one by deviating to voting sincerely. Third, note that in any
equilibrium it must be that θ∗k = 1 for all k ∈ K∗. To see this notice that for T large
enough there always exists a voter who is indifferent between the policy positions of
candidates h and h + 1 in K∗. Since all candidates that are running for office must
tie in equilibrium, if θ∗h < 1 for some h ∈ K∗, candidate h can profitably deviate by
choosing θ˜h = θ
∗
h + ν, for some sufficiently small ν > 0 (winning the election with
probability one). We have then established that in any equilibrium (i) candidates
running for office must tie, (ii) voting is sincere, and (iii) θ∗k = 1 for all k ∈ K∗.
We show next that there cannot be an electoral equilibrium with K > 2 candidates
running for office representing different ideological positions. If this were the case,
(i) and (iii) imply that by deviating and voting for any candidate j other than her
preferred candidate, a voter could get candidate j elected with probability one. But
then equilibrium implies that this voter must prefer the lottery among all K∗ running
candidates to having j elected for sure. This implies, in particular, that
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
u(1, x∗k; z
i) ≥ u(1, x∗K−1; zi) (11)
for all voters such that zi >
x∗K−1+x
∗
K
2
, i.e., all voters whose most preferred winning
candidate is k = K and next most preferred winning candidate is k = K − 1. On the
other hand, strict concavity of u(·; zi) with respect to policy and (i), and (iii) imply
that for all zi
u
(
1,
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
x∗k; z
i
)
>
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
u(1, x∗k; z
i). (12)
Combining (11) and (12), we obtain
u
(
1,
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
x∗k; z
i
)
> u(1, x∗K−1; z
i)
for all voters such that zi > (x∗K−1 + x
∗
K)/2. But for K > 2, concavity also implies
that for zi = (x∗K−1 + x
∗
K)/2, i.e., the voter who is indifferent between candidates K
6
and K − 1, the following must hold:
u
(
1,
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
x∗k;
x∗K−1 + x
∗
K
2
)
≤ u
(
1, x∗K−1;
x∗K−1 + x
∗
K
2
)
.
Hence, for large T , if K > 2 there exist a zi > (x∗K−1 + x
∗
K)/2 sufficiently close to
(x∗K−1 + x
∗
K)/2 such that
u
(
1,
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
x∗k; z
i
)
> u(1, x∗K−1; z
i) ≥ u
(
1,
1
|K∗|
∑
k∈K∗
x∗k; z
i
)
,
which is impossible. When K = 2, the fact that candidates must be symmetrically
located follows immediately.
Finally, note that c + F ≤ 1
2
implies that a unique candidate equilibrium cannot
be supported, since otherwise a second candidate, symmetrically located with respect
to the median, will always find it profitable to run. As a result, the only possible
equilibrium must have exactly two symmetrically located candidates fully investing
in campaign. We are only left to show that such an equilibrium exists. So consider a
strategy profile with two candidates fully investing in persuasive campaigning, 1 and
2, symmetrically located around the median voter (i.e., x1 = 1− x2 < 1/2), compete
for office. Voters vote sincerely among these two candidates on the equilibrium path.
If, off the equilibrium path, a third candidate ` enters the electoral competition, then
we require that voters vote sincerely among candidates in {1, 2} for all (θ1, θ2, θ3) for
which max {θ1, θ2} = 1. We show that this strategy profile is an electoral equilibrium.
First note that on the equilibrium path, voters are best responding, since with two
candidates strategic voting is sincere. Next note that given that c + F ≤ 1
2
, equi-
librium rents of the two candidates running for office are always non-negative. Since
candidates are choosing maximal investment in equilibrium, θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = 1, the only
possible deviation in the campaing game is downwards. But any such deviation would
entail sure loss, and is thus not profitable. Suppose now that a third candidate ` such
that x` ∈ [0, 1] decides to enter. Recall that voters vote sincerely among candidates
in {1, 2} for all (θ1, θ2, θ3) for which max {θ1, θ2} = 1. But given these strategies,
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there is no voter which can benefit from a deviation. In fact, since candidates 1 and 2
are tying, any deviation from sincere voting between candidate 1 and candidate 2 in
order to support the entrant will determine a victory of the least preferred candidate
instead of having a lottery between k = 1 and k = 2. But then the strategy profile
(x∗1, θ1 = 1), (x
∗
2 = 1−x∗1, θ2 = 1), (x3, θ3 = 0), together with the same strategy profile
for voters is an equilibrium in the continuation, and entry is not profitable.
Proof of Proposition 3. (1) For given n, consider a strategy profile in which
two candidates fully investing in persuasive campaigning, 1 and 2, symmetrically
located around the median voter (i.e., x1 = 1 − x2 < 1/2), compete for office. Vot-
ers vote sincerely among these two candidates on the equilibrium path. If, off the
equilibrium path, a third candidate ` enters the electoral competition, then we re-
quire that voters vote sincerely among candidates in {1, 2} for all (θ1, θ2, θ3) for which
max {θ1, θ2} = 1.2 We show that a strategy profile of this class, with ∆ ≡ x2 − x1
sufficiently small, is an electoral equilibrium for large n. First note that on the equi-
librium path, voters are best responding, since with two candidates strategic voting
is sincere. Next note that given c + F ≤ 1
2
, equilibrium rents of the two candidates
running for office are always non-negative. Since candidates are choosing maximal
campaign investment in equilibrium, θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 = 1, the only possible deviation in the
campaign game is downwards. So suppose that candidate 1 deviates to some θ1 < 1.
Note that since candidates were tying in equilibrium, and that voters must vote sin-
cerely, this deviation entails the loss of the majority premium γ for sure. Given
θ∗2 = 1, and θ1 < 1, the payoff of candidate 1, Π1 = (1−γ)x˜12(θ1, 1)−C(θ1) is contin-
uous and differentiable (as before, x˜12(θ1, θ2) represents the voter who is indifferent
between candidates 1 and 2 given θ1, θ2). Extending the choice set to include θ1 = 1,
but assuming away the possibility of obtaining the majority premium γ, the most
2It is not necessary to specify the strategy profile any further.
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profitable “deviation” is then to play
θˆ1 =
{
Ψ−1
(
∆
α(1−γ)
)
if ∆ > α(1− γ)Ψ(1),
1 if ∆ ≤ α(1− γ)Ψ(1).
(13)
It follows that if ∆ ≤ α(1− γ)Ψ(1), 1 prefers not to deviate. To deter this deviation,
therefore, it suffices to consider strategy profiles such that ∆ ≤ α(1−γ)Ψ(1). Suppose
now that a third candidate ` such that x` ∈ [0, 1] decides to enter. Recall that voters
vote sincerely among candidates in {1, 2} for all (θ1, θ2, θ3) for which max {θ1, θ2} = 1.
But given these strategies, no voter can benefit from a deviation, provided that n is
large enough. To see this, suppose without loss of generality that voter i prefers
candidate 1 to candidate 2, and note that i’s equilibrium payoff, voting for k = 1, is
U(1;σv−i) =
(
1
2
(1− γ) + γ
2
)
[u(x1; zi) + u(x2; zi)] .
Deviating and voting for an entrant `, i obtains
U(`;σv−i) =
n− 2
2n
(1− γ)u(x1; zi) +
(
1
2
(1− γ) + γ
)
u(x2; zi) +
1
n
(1− γ)u(x`; zi).
For equilibrium, it is necessary that U(`;σv−i) − U(1;σv−i) < 0, which is always
true if u(x`; zi) < u(x1; zi). If instead u(x`; zi) > u(x1; zi), this occurs if and only if
1− γ
γ
<
n
2
[u(x1; zi)− u(x2; zi)]
[u(x`; zi)− u(x1; zi)] ,
but this is satisfied for large enough n, since x1 6= x2. This concludes the proof of
part (i).
(2) Suppose, contrary to the statement of the proposition, that there does not
exist such n. Then for any n there exists n′ > n such that K ≥ 3 candidates tie for
the win in Γ˜n. We show that this is not possible. First, note that if a set of candidates
W ⊆ K tie for the win, then all voters voting for candidates in W ⊆ K vote for their
preferred candidate within W (for otherwise a voter could induce a strictly preferred
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lottery over outcomes by voting for her preferred candidate in W ). But then θk = 1
for all k ∈ W , for otherwise there exists a candidate ` ∈ W with θ` < 1, who would
gain from deviating to θ′` = θ` + η for sufficiently small η > 0. So suppose first that
in equilibrium all K > 2 candidates in K tie, with θk = 1 for all k, and let k∗(i)
denote i’s preferred candidate in K. It is immediate here that all voting is sincere,
for otherwise any voter not voting sincerely would induce a strictly preferred lottery
over outcomes by voting for their preferred candidate k∗(i). Since all candidates are
tying choosing maximal campaign investment and voting is sincere, candidates must
be equally spaced. Next, note that equilibrium implies that all voters i ∈ N must
prefer the equal probability lottery among all k ∈ K induced in equilibrium to the
lottery that is implied after a deviation to any candidate ` 6= k∗(i). Now, if for any n
there exists n′ > n such that this strategy profile is an equilibrium, it must be that
all voters i ∈ N must prefer the equal probability lottery among all k ∈ W induced
in equilibrium to the degenerate lottery in which they get any candidate ` 6= k∗(i) for
sure. To see this, note that i’s equilibrium payoff, voting for k∗(i), is
U(k∗(i);σv−i) =
∑
k∈K
[
1
K
n− 1
n
(1− γ) + γ
K
]
u(xk; zi) +
1
n
(1− γ)u(xk∗(i); zi).
Deviating and voting for ` 6= k∗(i), i obtains
U(`;σv−i) =
∑
k∈K
[
1
K
n− 1
n
(1− γ)
]
u(xk; zi) +
[
1
N
(1− γ) + γ
]
u(x`; zi).
The deviation gain U(`;σv−i)− U(k∗(i);σv−i) < 0 implies then that
u(x`; zi)− 1
K
∑
k∈K
u(xk; zi) <
1
n
(1− γ)
γ
[
u(xk∗(i); zi)− u(x`; zi)
]
,
but since for any n there exists n′ > n such that this strategy profile is an equi-
librium, it must be that u(x`; zi) <
1
K
∑
k∈K u(xk; zi), for otherwise, we can always
find an n′ that would reverse this inequality. Thus, if there does not exist a largest
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finite n for which all K > 2 candidates in K can tie in equilibrium, it must be that
all voters i ∈ N must prefer the equal probability lottery among all k ∈ W induced
in equilibrium to the degenerate lottery in which they get any candidate ` 6= k∗(i) for
sure. But then the same argument as in Proposition 2 shows that this can not be an
equilibrium.
Next suppose that 2 ≤ |W | < K candidates tie for the win in equilibrium, where
again W denotes the set of winning candidates and L the set of losing candidates.
This cannot be an equilibrium either for sufficiently large n, since otherwise a voter
i voting for one of the losing candidates `0 ∈ L could gain by breaking the tie among
the candidates in W in favor of her favorite candidate among W , w0. To see this,
denote the fraction of votes obtained by candidate in W by ω, and note that i’s
equilibrium payoff, voting for `0 ∈ L, is
U(`0;σ
v
−i) =
∑
w∈W
[
ω(1− γ) + γ|W |
]
u(xw; zi) +
∑
`∈L
t`
n
(1− γ)u(x`; zi).
The expected payoff of deviating and voting for w0 ∈ W is instead
U(w0;σ
v
−i) =
∑
w∈W
ω(1− γ)u(xw; zi) +
[
1
n
(1− γ) + γ
]
u(xw0 ; z
i) +
∑
` 6=`0∈L
t`
n
(1− γ)u(x`; zi) + (t`0 − 1)
n
(1− γ)u(x`0 ; zi).
But then U(w0;σ
v
−i)− U(`0;σv−i) > 0 if and only if
γ
1− γ >
1
n
[u(x`0 ; z
i)− u(xw0 ; zi)][
u(xw0 ; z
i)− 1|W |
∑
w∈W u(xw; zi)
] ,
which holds for sufficiently large n.
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2 Robustness
2.1 Policy Motivated Candidates
We have argued above that our main results are qualitatively unchanged if we allow
candidates to be both policy and office motivated, as long as the office motivation
is sufficiently important. In essence, we can think of the benchmark model as a
simplified version of a more general model, where office motivation dominates but
does not preclude, policy motivation.3 In this section, we make this argument more
precise. We write the expected gross payoff of a candidate k running for office in
electoral system j as
Πjk(K, xK, θK) = µmjk(θK, xK)− (1− µ)
∑
l∈K\k
mjl (θK, xK)(xl − xk)2 − C(θk)− F,
where µ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the weight attached to office motivation, and as before,
mPEk (θK, xK) = sk(θK, xK), and m
ME
k (θK, xK) =
1
|Hk| if sk ≥ maxj 6=k{sj}, zero oth-
erwise. Note that our benchmark model is nested in the above specification when
µ = 1.
Consider first majoritarian elections. Introducing policy motivation in ME has
one relevant effect in equilibrium: the payoff differential of running for office or not
for any given candidate now depends on how she evaluates the policy position of the
other candidates running for office. In particular, for any given µ, each candidate
will have a smaller incentive to run for office the closer the other candidates are
to her position in the policy space. Consider a proposed equilibrium candidate in
which two candidates j = 1, 2 are symmetrically located in the policy space, at
a distance ∆. Note that the payoff of candidate j in the proposed equilibrium is
µ/2− (1−µ)∆2/2−c−F , while her payoff is −(1−µ)∆2 if she does not run for office
(since in this case candidate 2 wins for sure). Thus candidate 1 prefers to run for office
3The classical reference for models in which candidates are office motivated is Hotelling (1929).
Wittman (1977, 1983) and Calvert (1985) assume instead that candidates are policy motivated. See
the “citizen-candidate” models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), and
more recently Callander (2008) for models with both policy and office motivation.
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if and only if (µ+ (1− µ)∆2) /2−c−F ≥ 0, or equivalently µ+(1−µ)∆2 ≥ 2 (c+ F ).
For a given µ not too large (µ < 2(c + F )) this introduces a bound on how close
candidates can be in equilibrium. On the other hand, since c + F < 1/2, it follows
that for any ∆ > 0, candidate 1 will prefer to run for office rather than not if the
office motivation µ is sufficiently large. The previous argument seems special in that
it assumes two candidates symmetrically located in the policy space. However, it
is easy to see that every other step in the proof of Proposition 2 (for ME) remains
unchanged. Thus in any equilibrium in competitive ME we must have two candidates
running for office symmetrically located in the policy space. Formally, we have the
following result.
Proposition 1 Consider majoritarian elections in which candidates have both office
and policy motivations. There exists a weight on office motivation µˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
if µ > µˆ, then (a) there exists an equilibrium in which elections are contested, and (b)
in any equilibrium in which candidates represent different ideological positions: (i)
exactly two candidates compete for office, (ii) candidates are symmetrically located
around the median in the policy space (i.e., x1 + x2 = 1), and (iii) both candidates
fully invest in persuasive campaigning.
Introducing policy motivation in PE has two relevant effects in equilibrium. First,
there is an effect on entry, similar in spirit to that in ME. In addition, there is now a
second effect of policy motivation, that operates in the campaign competition stage,
after the field of candidates is resolved. As candidates become better substitutes
for voters, the marginal rent-related benefit of campaigning increases, just as in the
benchmark model. But now there is also a marginal policy-related benefit of cam-
paigning, which decreases as candidates get closer to each other. We show, however,
that if the office motivation is sufficiently strong, the marginal rent-related benefit
of campaigning dominates the marginal policy-related benefit of campaigning, and
the analysis of the benchmark model is fundamentally unaltered. Fix µ ∈ (0, 1),
and consider a LS equilibrium. The equilibrium payoff for an interior candidate
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k = 2, . . . , K − 1 is
Πk(θK, xK,K) = µ
(
∆ + α
(
v(θk)− v(θk+1)
∆
+
v(θk)− v(θk−1)
∆
))
+
−(1− µ)
∑
l∈K\k
sl(θK, xK)(xl − xk)2 − C(θk)− F.
Thus k’s best response is
θ∗k =
Ψ
−1
(
∆
2αµ˜∆
)
if Ψ−1
(
∆
2αµ˜∆
)
≤ 1
1 if Ψ−1
(
∆
2αµ˜∆
)
> 1,
where µ˜∆ ≡ µ+ (1−µ)∆2. Note that if the office motivation is sufficiently important
relative to the policy motivation (here it is enough that µ > 1/2) then the equilibrium
level of campaigning θ∗ is decreasing in the differentiation between candidates ∆. This
suggests that when office motivation is sufficiently important, the analysis of PE with
policy motivation is similar to that of the benchmark model. This intuition is in fact
correct, and allows us to establish the following proposition
Proposition 2 Consider proportional elections in which candidates have both office
and policy motivations. There exists a weight on office motivation µ˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that
if µ > µ˜, then PE (i) admit electoral equilibria in which more than two candidates
run for office without fully investing in persuasive campaigning, and (ii) do not admit
electoral equilibria in which two or more centrist candidates run for office.
The proof of this proposition (which is available from the authors upon request) is
very similar to showing the analogous result in the context of the benchmark model.
The main difference is that the bounds on ideological differentiation will now also
be a function of µ. Combining Proposition 2 together with Proposition 1 we can
conclude that our main results also hold when office motivation dominates, but does
not preclude, policy motivation.
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2.2 Representation and Policy Outcomes
A central element of any model of elections is the mapping from votes in the electorate
to a set of elected representatives. With fully rational and strategic voters, however,
a second element of the model becomes equally important. In order for rational
voters to be able to link their vote choices to payoffs, they need to be endowed with
a mapping from the characteristics of the set of elected representatives to final policy
outcomes. In this paper we have maintained the simplifying assumption that the
policy outcome in PE comes about as the realization of a probabilistic compromise
among the policies represented by the candidates participating in the election, with
weights equal to their vote shares (or seat share in the assembly).
The assumption of a probabilistic compromise simplifies considerably the analysis
of electoral equilibria in PE: given probabilistic compromise in the elected legislature,
all voters find voting for their most preferred candidate to be a dominant strategy,
and thus sincere voting is rational on and off the equilibrium path; this, in turn,
produces vote share functions that are uniquely determined, continuous, and well
behaved, on and off the equilibrium path. It should be clear, however, that the
assumption of a probabilistic compromise does not bias the results towards lower
levels of campaign spending than what would obtain under alternative protocols for
determination of policy: if anything, sincere voting facilitates entry, and therefore
leads to less ideological differentiation and higher levels of investment in persuasive
campaign in equilibrium. In this section we complement this logic by showing that
our main results hold under alternative specifications of the policy function mapping
elected representatives to policy outcomes.
First of all it is immediate to see that within the probabilistic compromise frame-
work weights need not be equal to election shares. Indeed, any probabilistic compro-
mise such that the weights are a nondecreasing, anonymous/symmetric function of
the election shares would leave all results unchanged. Furthermore, any alternative
mechanism inducing sincere voting will lead to the same results. More interestingly
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perhaps, we show that under two simple alternative non-stochastic protocols for the
determination of policy in the elected assembly, which do encourage voters to vote
strategically under some conditions, our results hold unchanged. We consider first
the median protocol :
Definition 1 The Median Protocol For given profile (xK, θK), and vote shares
{sk}, the outcome is (xk˜, θk˜), where k˜ ≡ min k :
∑
j∈K sj ≥ 1/2 is the (seat-weighted)
median representative.
In the median protocol, the policy outcome is determined by the characteristics
of the median representative in the assembly. By seat-weighted representative we
mean that for the purposes of computing the median, candidate k with vote share
sk is assumed to be equivalent to a mass sk of individuals representing policy xk.
Proposition A1 shows that the conclusions of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 hold
unchanged under the median protocol.
Proposition 3 (A1) Suppose the policy outcome is determined according to the me-
dian protocol. Then PE admit an electoral equilibrium in which more than two candi-
dates run for office without fully investing in persuasive campaign. Furthermore, any
candidate strategy profile that can be supported in a LS equilibrium in PE under a
probabilistic compromise can be supported as an equilibrium with the median protocol.
To see why the result obtains, note first that on the equilibrium path of a LS equi-
librium, sincere voting is a rational voting strategy profile. In fact, in a LS equilibrium
with K ≥ 3 candidates, extreme candidates can never become the median legislator,
and all non-extreme candidates choose to invest equally in persuasive campaign θ∗.
Since voters have single-peaked preferences in the ideological dimension, this im-
plies that voters have single-peaked preferences among all relevant options. As a
result, any voter i can never gain by not voting for her preferred candidate: either
her deviation produces no change in the median (e.g., when i votes for any candidate
on the same side of the median in the ideological space) or it produces a detrimental
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change in the outcome (e.g, when i votes for a candidate on the opposite side of the
median in the ideological space).
If the profile of candidates’ campaign expenditures is not symmetric, however, as
would occur off the equilibrium path following deviations by an equilibrium candidate
in the campaign stage (or in the continuation game after entry of a non-equilibrium
candidate), then strategic voting can become rational.4
We next show, however, that (i) sincere voting is rational in any voting subgame
of a LS equilibrium following a deviation in the campaign stage by an equilibrium
candidate, and that (ii) for every deviation at the entry stage, there is an equilibrium
in the continuation voting subgame in which either all or all but a small number
of voters vote sincerely, and for which out of equilibrium entry is not sequentially
rational.
Consider first voting subgames following a deviation in campaign investment by an
equilibrium candidate in a LS equilibrium. Suppose that candidate k deviates to θk 6=
θ∗. We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that this cannot be a profitable deviation
for k if voters vote sincerely. Moreover, given that candidates care exclusively about
vote shares this cannot be a profitable deviation if all but a small number of voters
vote sincerely either. As a result, a sufficiently large number of voters must be voting
strategically for this to be a profitable deviation. On the other hand, if any voter is
to vote strategically, it must be that k is either tying or contending for the median
position by at most one vote. But this implies that if all voters vote sincerely, k can’t
be close to contending for the median, and therefore no voter can have an incentive to
4To see this, consider three candidates, 1, 2 and 3, such that x1 < x2 < x3, and suppose that
θ1 > θ2 = θ3. Then some voter i who would rank candidates 3 &i 2 &i 1 on a purely ideological
dimension, could possibly rank candidates 1 &i 3 &i 2 when taking into consideration both their
ideology and the level of persuasive campaigning, leading to a non-single-peaked preference profile
(this requires of course the investment differential to be sufficiently high given the responsiveness of
voters to persuasive campaigning, α). In this circumstance, our previous analysis of the rationality
of a sincere voting profile would not necessarily apply: if i is decisive for the median between 1 and
2 she would prefer to select 1, so sincere voting is rational for i. But if i were decisive for the median
among candidates 2 and 3, then i would find it optimal to deviate from sincere voting and vote
strategically for 3.
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vote strategically for candidate k. Since all other relevant candidates choose the same
level of campaigning, then there cannot be strategic voting for any other candidate
either, and sincere voting is rational.5 Thus choosing θ∗ is a best response for k in
the campaign competition stage.
Similarly, we can show that for every deviation at the entry stage, there is an
equilibrium in the continuation voting subgame in which either all or all but a small
number of voters vote sincerely, and for which out of equilibrium entry is not sequen-
tially rational.
Consider then a deviation at the entry stage. Note that if voters vote sincerely
after every continuation, or if all but a small number of voters vote sincerely after every
continuation, then entry is not profitable, in the sense that for every possible entry
there exists an equilibrium in the continuation game such that the entrant obtains a
negative payoff. Now suppose that after a deviation at the entry stage, candidates
play the continuation strategy profile that deters entry in the proof of Proposition 1,
and suppose that all voters vote sincerely. Then the event in which two candidates
contend for the median position by a one vote difference given sincere voting and
given this particular strategy profile by candidates has probability zero. But if no
two candidates are contending for the median position by a one vote difference, sincere
voting is rational.
Now consider a deviation from this profile by one of the candidates. By our pre-
vious argument, this can only be a profitable deviation if a sufficiently large number
of voters is voting strategically in the voting subgame following this deviation. But
then we can always choose a voting strategy profile in which all but a small number of
voters vote sincerely. Then no voter can be decisive for the median, and no voter will
have an incentive to deviate. All voters, moreover, are using undominated strategies
(we know that voters voting sincerely are not using weakly dominated strategies, but
neither are the voters who continue to vote as in the strategic voting profile, since
5Moreover, voting sincerely is not a weakly dominated strategy for any voter i, as it is always
possible to find a voting profile for the remaining voters for which i’s vote can be decisive between
i’s favorite candidate and some other candidate running for office.
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in fact this was a best response against this strategy profile by the other voters).
Since candidates only care about voting shares, and since with a large electorate the
impact of a small number of votes on payoffs is negligible, this cannot be a profitable
deviation. This concludes the argument.
A result similar in spirit to what we obtained under the median protocol can be
shown to hold in an environment in which the policy outcome obtains as a convex
combination of the ideological position of the elected representatives. We call this
the bargaining protocol of policy determination.
Definition 2 The Bargaining Protocol For given profile (xK, θK), the policy out-
come is (
∑
k∈K sjxj, θk˜), where k˜ is the identity of the candidate obtaining a plurality
of the votes.
While a full characterization of electoral equilibria under the bargaining protocol
is beyond the scope of this paper, here we provide a simple example in which candi-
dates running for office do not fully invest in persuasive campaigning.
Example 4. Let α < 1/Ψ(1) and consider a two-candidate on-the-equilibrium-
path action profile (x1 = 0, x2 = 1, θ1 = θ2 = θ
∗ ≡ Ψ−1(1/α) < 1). Given this action
profile, sincere voting is rational and therefore θ∗ is optimal (this follows from the
best response correspondence for extreme candidates). Suppose that upon entry of
a non-equlibrium candidate, all voters would still vote for their preferred candidate
among the equilibrium candidates 1 and 2. Note that no voter would find it optimal
to deviate from this voting strategy profile and vote for the entrant, for this deviation
could only move the policy outcome away from the voter’s ideal point. It follows that
this is an electoral equilibrium.
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To sum up, we have shown that our main results hold under alternative speci-
fications of the policy function mapping elected representatives to policy outcomes,
and therefore are not driven by our assumption that policy outcomes are determined
as a probabilistic compromise among elected representatives. In particular, any al-
ternative mechanism inducing sincere voting will leave Proposition 2 and Theorem
1 unchanged. As the previous analysis shows, even alternative protocols for the
determination of policy that do not lead to sincere voting being rational in all con-
tinuation games are consistent with our conclusions. The logic of entry deterrence
in non-majoritarian electoral systems works easily with sincere voting but does not
require it.
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